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When a father did not redeem his firstborn son, does the grown son have a mitzvah (מצוה) to redeem himself, or merely a benefit (tikun ha'gufo)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of malveh kisuva b'Torah (תורה) and ona'ah l'lekuchos proves there is no independent mitzvah on the son. The Rambam (רמב"ם) paskens that mitzvah d'gufo takes precedence in kadimah—but not enough to uproot the son's actual mitzvah when both can be fulfilled.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 29a concerning the laws of pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn son) when the father has limited resources. The central question is whether a grown son who was not redeemed by his father has an independent mitzvah (מצוה) to redeem himself, or whether pidyon haben remains exclusively the father's mitzvah. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Chachamim. When a father and his son both need to be redeemed and there are only enough resources for one, Rabbi Yehuda holds the son takes precedence because "this is the father's mitzvah on his son, while that (the father's own redemption) is the mitzvah of his father upon him." The Chachamim hold the father comes first. Rav Yirmiyahu adds that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, if there are only five sela'im available (enough for just one redemption), the father precedes his son because "mitzvah d'gufo adif" (a mitzvah affecting one's own person takes precedence).
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Kiddushin 29a
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