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What constitutes real ownership in matana al menas lehachzir (a gift given on condition it be returned)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s proof from terumah challenges whether temporary ownership suffices for kinyan kesef in kiddushin. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation—listing shorter durations first, then longer—and his apparent shift from kinyan kesef to kinyan chalipin raise fundamental questions about the nature of acquisition when the recipient must return the object.
The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s principle that matana al menas lehachzir (a gift given on condition of return) is considered a valid matana (gift), examining its application to kiddushin and other kinyanim. The discussion opens with the Gemara in Kiddushin 6b and related sources in Nedarim 40, where the Gemara establishes that for a gift to be valid, the recipient must have the right to be mochel (forgive/waive) it. The Rishonim ask: by matana al menas lehachzir, the recipient cannot be mochel since he is obligated to return it, yet the Gemara validates such gifts—why? Three major Rishonim answer that in the Nedarim case, the gift was merely a sham to circumvent the neder, whereas matana al menas lehachzir involves genuine transfer of ownership despite the return condition. The Ri offers a different approach: the recipient does have something to be mochel—namely, the value or benefit he derives from the object (such as being yotzei the mitzvah (מצוה) of lulav), even though he cannot keep the object itself.
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Kiddushin 6b
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