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When a husband sends a get and then tries to cancel it before it reaches his wife, can the cancellation work? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether dibur (speech) can be mevatel (nullify) dibur, and whether cancellation can be done through a shaliach. Rabbi Zweig develops the yesod that there are two fundamentally different types of shlichut—one where the shaliach becomes the sender (gerushin), and one where the shaliach merely acts on behalf (kiddushin)—which explains the entire sugya's mechanics.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 79a, which discusses the laws of canceling a get (divorce document) after it has been sent through a shaliach but before it reaches the wife. The Mishna presents two cases: when the husband catches up to the shaliach directly, and when he sends a second shaliach to cancel the first one. In both cases, the husband declares "get zu botel" (this get is canceled), and the Mishna rules that indeed the get is canceled. The Gemara (גמרא) raises a fundamental question: we already know from the first case that a husband can cancel a get by catching up to the shaliach directly, so why does the Mishna need to teach the second case of sending a shaliach to cancel? Isn't shlichut for cancellation obvious once we know direct cancellation works?
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Gittin 79a
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