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When a thief sells stolen property on Shabbos (שבת), is he liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes why the kinyan (acquisition) should be valid even though transactions are rabbinically forbidden on Shabbos. The key distinction: since the sale is already invalid mid'oraisa (because the thief doesn't own it), the rabbinic Shabbos prohibition on legitimate transactions doesn't apply—there's no issur to sell what isn't yours.
This shiur explores Bava Kamma 70b, focusing on the Mishna's case of gonav u'mocher b'Shabbos (שבת) (a thief who sells on Shabbos). The central question is whether such a sale renders the thief liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment (tashlumei arba v'chamesh), given that kinyanim (acquisitions) are rabbinically prohibited on Shabbos. The shiur begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s cryptic comment on the Mishna. Rashi seems to focus on the latter part of the Mishna (gonav u'tovach is patur) rather than explaining why gonav u'mocher on Shabbos would be chayav. This raises the question: what is the chiddush of the Mishna? Is it teaching that mocher (selling) creates liability, or that tovach (slaughtering) does not?
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Bava Kamma 70b
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