No community start suggestion yet.
When a man gives money to woman A saying "harei at mekudeshes li" and adds "ve'at" to woman B, is the ambiguous reference (yad) sufficient to create kiddushin for woman B? The shiur analyzes why context (umdena) can define an existing act of kiddushin but cannot create a new act through speech alone, distinguishing between umdena that interprets a deed versus umdana that generates a legal reality.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on Nedarim 6b concerning the principle of yesh yad lekiddushin (whether indirect language suffices for kiddushin). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a man gives money to woman A saying "harei at mekudeshes li" and then adds "ve'at" (and you) to woman B. The Rishonim, including the Ran, assume we understand he means kiddushin for both women, but the question is whether this ambiguous reference (yad) is legally effective—the classic question of yesh yad lekiddushin or ein yad lekiddushin. Rabbi Zweig presents a fundamental difficulty: if we know with certainty what the man intends (an umdena that he means kiddushin for woman B), why shouldn't this work like the Gemara's principle in Kiddushin that when parties are osukim b'oso inyan (engaged in discussing that matter) and the man gives money without saying anything, she is mekudeshes? There, the umdena from the circumstances tells us he means kiddushin. Similarly here, we have an umdena that he wants to marry woman B—so why doesn't the umdena create kiddushin?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim 6b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
