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When a man gives money to woman A saying "harei at mekudeshes li" and adds "ve'at" to woman B, is the ambiguous reference (yad) sufficient to create kiddushin for woman B? The shiur analyzes why context (umdena) can define an existing act of kiddushin but cannot create a new act through speech alone, distinguishing between umdena that interprets a deed versus umdana that generates a legal reality.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on Nedarim 6b concerning the principle of yesh yad lekiddushin (whether indirect language suffices for kiddushin). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a man gives money to woman A saying "harei at mekudeshes li" and then adds "ve'at" (and you) to woman B. The Rishonim, including the Ran, assume we understand he means kiddushin for both women, but the question is whether this ambiguous reference (yad) is legally effective—the classic question of yesh yad lekiddushin or ein yad lekiddushin. Rabbi Zweig presents a fundamental difficulty: if we know with certainty what the man intends (an umdena that he means kiddushin for woman B), why shouldn't this work like the Gemara's principle in Kiddushin that when parties are osukim b'oso inyan (engaged in discussing that matter) and the man gives money without saying anything, she is mekudeshes? There, the umdena from the circumstances tells us he means kiddushin. Similarly here, we have an umdena that he wants to marry woman B—so why doesn't the umdena create kiddushin?
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Nedarim 6b
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