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Is the declaration "bifanai nechtav u'bifanai nechtam" testimony about divorce or validation of the get document itself? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira between the Ramban (רמב"ן) (who views a shtar as testimony requiring two witnesses) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) (who treats kiyum shtar as document authentication—a matter of issur requiring only one witness). This distinction reshapes when and how a get can be validated.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the fundamental dispute between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and the Ramban (רמב"ן) regarding the nature of documents (shtarot) and their validation. The central question is whether witnesses signing a shtar are testifying about an event or creating the legal reality through the document itself. Rabbi Zweig begins by identifying several core disputes: the Rambam (Hilchos Gerushin 7:24) holds a woman can remarry with a get that is not mekuyam (formally validated), while the Raavad requires kiyum. Similarly, Rashi (רש"י) and the Rivash disagree about whether a woman who is already divorced can later say "bifanai nechtav u'bifanai nechtam" (it was written and signed before me). According to Rashi, if she says it, she is believed; according to the Rivash (following the Raavad), her statement would not be believed after the fact. The Rivash also rules that if a shliach did not say bifanai nechtav when delivering the get and the husband dies, the shliach cannot validate the get afterward.
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Gittin 2a
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