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Why does the Gemara (גמרא)'s answer to a question about eidus in Beis Din cite the principle of eid echad ne'eman b'isurim, which applies outside of Beis Din? The shiur analyzes this fundamental jump in Gittin 2a—from requiring two witnesses in a judicial setting to accepting one witness in non-judicial matters—and explores whether beyado lesaken creates a middle ground when there is a chazakah d'isura.
This shiur presents a fundamental analysis of the opening sugya of Masechta Gittin (2a), which discusses how many witnesses are required to validate that a get (bill of divorce) was written lishmah (for the sake of the specific woman). The Gemara (גמרא) begins with the assumption that two witnesses are required, following the general Torah (תורה) principle of kal eid yashiv es haTorah. The Gemara then answers with the principle of eid echad ne'eman b'isurim—one witness is believed regarding matters of issur and heter. Rabbi Zweig identifies a profound difficulty in the Gemara's structure. The original question assumed we need two witnesses testifying in Beis Din in a formal judicial proceeding. Yet the Gemara's answer—eid echad ne'eman b'isurim—according to Rashi (רש"י), refers to cases entirely outside of Beis Din, such as someone telling you meat is kosher or that terumah was separated. This represents not merely a reduction from two witnesses to one, but a complete shift from judicial testimony (hagadas eidus in Beis Din) to informal, non-judicial information given outside of Beis Din. Furthermore, Rashi indicates that even a pasul (disqualified witness) can serve as this single witness. The shakla v'tarya (give-and-take) of the Gemara seems to jump from one category to an entirely different one.
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Gittin 2a
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