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When an animal takes food from one domain and eats it in another, are you liable based on where it ate (basar achilah) or where it took it from (basar lekicha)? The shiur explores the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot in understanding the Gemara (גמרא)'s approach to misgalgel (rolling items), and examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s novel approach that addresses Tosafot's difficulty by reversing the case entirely.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Bava Kamma 20a concerning the liability of a behemah (animal) that takes food from one domain (reshus) and eats it in another. The central question is whether liability follows the location of the taking (lekicha) or the eating (achilah), particularly when items roll (misgalgel) from one domain to another. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach understands the Gemara (גמרא) as presenting two possibilities. The first option is that liability follows where the animal ate (basar achilah): if it ate in the reshus hayachid (private domain), the owner is liable (chayav); if it ate in the reshus harabim (public domain), he is exempt (patur). The second option is that liability follows where the item was taken from (basar lekicha). Rashi explains that in both readings, the braisa presents chiddushim—novel insights. According to the basar achilah reading, even though the food rolled from one domain to another, liability is determined by where it was ultimately consumed. According to the basar lekicha reading, even though the animal ate in a different domain, liability follows the original location of the taking.
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Bava Kamma 20a
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