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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) mandate that a husband tell his wife to light Shabbos (שבת) candles "b'nichusa" (pleasantly)? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod from the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Tikkunei Zohar that Hadlakas Ner Shabbos is inherently a joint mitzvah (מצוה) of husband and wife, expressing shalom bayis through shared responsibility. When done with fear rather than partnership, it defeats the entire purpose and can lead to serious spiritual consequences.
The shiur opens with a Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 6b discussing a fundamental principle: one should not instill fear ("lo yamil emo yesar") into one's household. The Gemara derives this from the tragic story of Pilegesh B'Givah—because the woman was terrified of her husband, she fled, leading to catastrophic consequences. The Gemara teaches that such fear can lead to three serious transgressions: gilui arayos (sexual immorality), shfichas damim (bloodshed), and chilul Shabbos (שבת) (desecration of the Sabbath). The Gemara then presents a Mishna stating that a husband must say three things on Erev Shabbos: "Isartem" (Did you tithe?), "Eiravtem" (Did you make an eruv?), and "Hadliku es haner" (Light the candles). Critically, the Gemara adds that these must be said "b'nichusa" (in a pleasant manner) so that "tekabel minei" (she will accept it from him). Rashi (רש"י) explains that the first two are questions because the husband cannot see whether they were done, but the third—lighting candles—is stated as a command rather than a question because if the candles are already lit, it's visible and need not be asked.
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Gittin 6b
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