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Why does Beis Hillel forbid eggs laid on Yom Tov that falls after Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur explores Rabba's principle that Yom Tov preparation must come from chol, not Shabbos—a din called hachana. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach raises a fundamental question: is hachana stricter when preparation happens b'dei shamayim (by Heaven's hand) or b'dei adam (by human action)?
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Beitzah 2b, focusing on the concept of hachana—the prohibition against preparing on one holy day for another. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses the dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding eggs laid on Yom Tov, with Rabba explaining that when Yom Tov falls immediately after Shabbos (שבת), there is a concern of hachana. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding of the Mishna. According to Rashi, the entire Mishna is discussing the specific case of Yom Tov that falls after Shabbos, not just any Yom Tov. This represents a significant chiddush, as the Mishna's language ("beis she'noldu b'Yom Tov") appears to be speaking generally about eggs laid on Yom Tov, yet Rashi limits it to the case of Yom Tov after Shabbos. Rabba explains that Beis Hillel forbids these eggs due to hachana—the preparation that occurred on Shabbos (when the hen was preparing to lay) benefits Yom Tov, which is prohibited.
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Beitzah 2b
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