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Why does lav damari katavach ("it's not the owner's") exempt one from kefel? The shiur argues that Rashi (רש"י) reads the Gemara (גמרא) as addressing worthlessness, not ownership—an issur hana item still belongs to the owner but has no financial value. Tosafos (תוספות), the Poseik, and the principle of dover hagramama all turn on whether kefel requires ownership of the object or only a financial interest.
The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of shor niskal (an ox sentenced to stoning) and the principle of lav damari katavach ("it's not the owner's"), focusing on whether the exemption from paying kefel (double payment for theft) is due to lack of ownership or lack of financial value. Rabbi Zweig challenges the Gemara's formulation. The Gemara states that if one steals an ox that is already shor niskal, there is no kefel because "it's not the owner's." But Rabbi Zweig asks: if the ox was already shor niskal before the theft, the question should not be whether one is liable for shechita or mechira (slaughter or sale), but whether the very act of geneiva (theft) applies at all—lav damari kagana ("I didn't steal what belongs to him"). The Gemara's focus on lav damari katavach (relevant to what happens after the theft) seems to miss the more fundamental question.
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Bava Kamma 61b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
