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Why can a positive mitzvah (מצוה) override a prohibition even when they're not simultaneous? The shiur develops four foundational yesodos: lav she'aino shenitan lekol is chuchra (complete uprooting), not dechiya; once an asa can override, even an asa she'aino shenitan lekol can override a lav shenitan lekol; the sevarah of chuchra remains true lamaskana; and finally, the profound implications for hechsher mitzvah, Reish Lakish's din, and the nature of ein asa dechol lo saasa.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the fundamental principles governing the halachic concept of asa dechol lo saasa (a positive commandment overriding a prohibition), building on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion in Yevamos 5a. The shiur begins by reviewing several challenging questions raised in previous sessions about the mechanics of how a positive mitzvah (מצוה) can override a negative commandment. The first major question addressed is: How can someone else (the makif) perform the action when the mitzvah is on a different person (the nikuf)? For example, in the case of yibum, the mitzvah is on the man while the prohibition is on the woman. Similarly, in hakafa (removing corners of the beard), the prohibition of hakafa is on the makif (the one doing the cutting), while the mitzvah appears to be only on the nikuf (the one being cut). This creates a conceptual difficulty in applying the principle of asa dechol lo saasa.
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Yevamos 5a
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