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Does dichuy (disqualification) apply to mitzvah (מצוה) objects the way it applies to korbanot? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: by korbanot, dichuy is an intrinsic defect in the object itself; by mitzvos, any disqualification stems only from the gavra's inability to use it. This distinction explains why kisui hadam can be reactivated when uncovered, proving there is no dichuy etzel mitzvos.
The shiur opens with a Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah 33a analyzing whether there is dichuy (disqualification from mitzvah (מצוה) use) when hadasim that lacked leaves on erev Yom Tov later grew leaves on Yom Tov itself. Rashi (רש"י) emphasizes "mishinega" (that they grew), raising the question: why does Rashi need both conditions—that they grew AND that it's Yom Tov? This leads to an analysis of whether dichuy meikara (disqualification from the outset) applies to mitzvah objects. The Gemara brings a proof from kisui hadam: if wind covered the blood, one is not obligated to uncover it and re-cover it. But if the wind then uncovers it again, the obligation to cover returns. This proves there is no dichuy by mitzvos—despite the blood having been covered (and thus not requiring the mitzvah act), when it becomes uncovered the chiyuv is reinstated.
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Sukkah 33a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
