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When a man asks "if I give you this, will you marry me?" and the woman responds "hav" (give), is she accepting or rejecting? The Ran and Rashba disagree fundamentally on whether kiddushin requires the woman's active da'as makneh (transfer of herself) or merely passive acceptance without resistance. This determines whether "hav" constitutes agreement or refusal.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between the Ran and the Rashba regarding the nature of a woman's consent in kiddushin, focusing on the case where the woman responds "hav" (give) to a marriage proposal. The central question is whether this response constitutes acceptance or rejection of kiddushin. Rabbi Zweig establishes that the core machloket concerns what level of da'as (consent) is required from the woman in kiddushin. According to the Rashba, when a woman says "hav," there is an inherent deficiency (chesaron) in the response—she should have said "yes" if she meant to accept. The Ran disagrees, holding that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with saying "hav"; the only potential problem is dibur kama k'asama (reliance on earlier statements).
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Kiddushin 9a
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