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Can you legally transfer property that's not physically in your possession? The Gemara (גמרא) on Bava Kama 70a discusses writing an urkesa (power of attorney) for property held by another, with Rav Yochanan forbidding it when the item is "she'eino birishuso." The shiur analyzes the fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), and the Rashba on whether kinyan (acquisition) requires hachnasat reshut (entry into one's domain) or merely transfer of ownership.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Bava Kama 70a concerning the ability to transfer property that is not currently in one's physical possession. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses the law of urkesa (a document empowering an agent to collect property on one's behalf) when the property is held by a third party. The question arises: can someone write an urkesa to authorize Yehoshua to retrieve property from X when that property is not in the owner's reshut (domain)? The Gemara brings two positions. The first lashon cites Rav Yochanan who says "gezera velo nisya shaba shnei men yichon nahag" - just as one cannot be makdish (consecrate) stolen property, so too one cannot transfer a cheifetz she'eino birishuso (an object not in one's possession). The second lashon distinguishes: Amri Nehardai say you cannot write an urkesa when X is kofer (denies the claim), because it appears false (mechzi kishikra), but if he acknowledges it, you can.
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Bava Kama 70a
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