A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How should one approach a father who transgresses Torah (תורה) law? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between rhetorical criticism and genuine inquiry, introducing a prohibition against causing a parent distress (lo masir) even when the father is not observant. Rabbi Zweig reconciles the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s two treatments—in Hilchos Mamrim and Hilchos Talmud (תלמוד) Torah—showing that for an observant father one asks with true uncertainty, while for a non-observant father one phrases criticism as a question to avoid humiliation.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 32a, which addresses how a son should respond when he sees his father transgressing Torah (תורה) law. The Gemara (גמרא) begins with the principle that one cannot directly tell one's father "You have transgressed Torah law," but must instead ask in question form: "Is this what is written in the Torah?" The Gemara challenges this formulation as being equally insulting (tzurei kometzar), which leads to a refined answer: one must cite the verse itself "as if asking" (kish'ela). Rabbi Zweig explores Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation, noting difficulties in understanding what exactly changes between the unacceptable and acceptable formulations. Rashi seems to suggest that simply stating the verse allows the father to realize his error on his own. The exact mechanism of how this avoids causing distress remains somewhat unclear in Rashi's commentary.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 32a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
