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How should one approach a father who transgresses Torah (תורה) law? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between rhetorical criticism and genuine inquiry, introducing a prohibition against causing a parent distress (lo masir) even when the father is not observant. Rabbi Zweig reconciles the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s two treatments—in Hilchos Mamrim and Hilchos Talmud (תלמוד) Torah—showing that for an observant father one asks with true uncertainty, while for a non-observant father one phrases criticism as a question to avoid humiliation.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 32a, which addresses how a son should respond when he sees his father transgressing Torah (תורה) law. The Gemara (גמרא) begins with the principle that one cannot directly tell one's father "You have transgressed Torah law," but must instead ask in question form: "Is this what is written in the Torah?" The Gemara challenges this formulation as being equally insulting (tzurei kometzar), which leads to a refined answer: one must cite the verse itself "as if asking" (kish'ela). Rabbi Zweig explores Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation, noting difficulties in understanding what exactly changes between the unacceptable and acceptable formulations. Rashi seems to suggest that simply stating the verse allows the father to realize his error on his own. The exact mechanism of how this avoids causing distress remains somewhat unclear in Rashi's commentary.
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Kiddushin 32a
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