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What kind of ownership is created by a gift given on condition to return? The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 6b lists cases where matana al menas lehachzir works — mechira, kiddushin, pidyon haben, terumah — yet seems to permit all or forbid all. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental chakira: "ownership" sufficient to avoid being a she'elah may still lack the power to generate a reciprocal kinyan obligation, like transferring a field or acquiring a wife.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental question in hilchos kinyanim arising from the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 6b regarding matana al menas lehachzir — a gift given on condition that it be returned. The Gemara presents a series of cases: mechira (sale), kiddushin (betrothal), pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn), and matnas kehuna (gifts to Kohanim). The central question is whether such a conditional gift is considered a valid matana (gift) or merely a she'elah (loan). Rava's position appears to be that matana al menas lehachzir is considered shemo matana — a valid gift. However, the Gemara's language is perplexing. The Gemara asks: "meimonasho" — if matana al menas lehachzir is shemo matana, then all these cases should work; if it's not shemo matana, none should work. Yet the Gemara later distinguishes between these cases, particularly regarding whether it's assur lassos ken (forbidden to do so).
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Kiddushin 6b
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