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Why does a get require witnesses to sign lishma (for her sake) according to Rav Elazar? The shiur develops the principle that eidei chasima accomplish something fundamental—they transform the document into a valid shtar, even when eidei mesira are the primary mechanism of divorce. This explains why we decree chasima lishma, lest one come to write the get itself shelo lishma.
The shiur opens with a foundational question: according to Rav Elazar, who holds eidei mesira karsi (the witnesses of delivery validate the get), why do we pasul a get signed by witnesses who are related (mezuya mitoch)? If witnesses are not required for the get's validity, why does their signing improperly create a problem? Rashi (רש"י) explains that the concern is you might rely on the eidei chasima if the eidei mesira die. This reliance would be problematic if the witnesses are pasul (related or otherwise invalid). But Tosafot challenges this: if eidei chasima signed shelo lishma (not for her sake), which according to Rav Elazar is not me'akev, why would this create a problem? You're not relying on them for anything substantive—the get is valid through eidei mesira.
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Gittin 4a
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