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How does a get remain valid once the husband claims it's forged? The shiur examines the dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on the meaning of "ein b'kiyin lishma" and explores the mechanics of kiyum ha-shtar—whether yesterday's testimony by one witness can override today's Torah (תורה)-level concern of forgery when the husband contests the get.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 2a, focusing on the requirement that a get be written lishma (for the sake of the particular woman) and the procedural question of kiyum ha-shtar (validation of the document). The opening discussion centers on a textual difficulty in Rashi (רש"י): when the husband contests the get, Rashi indicates that the court cannot rely on comparing signatures alone but must have either the witnesses themselves testify or other witnesses identify their signatures. Rabbi Zweig suggests that this reflects a din d'Oraisa—that once the husband formally contests the document, Torah (תורה) law requires full eidus (testimony), not merely documentary comparison. The shiur then turns to a fundamental difficulty posed by Rabbeinu Avigdor Carlebach's reading: if the husband's contestation triggers a Torah-level requirement for two witnesses, how can the Gemara (גמרא) allow reliance on a single witness who testified the day before? According to the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach—that kiyum ha-shtar is fundamentally about validating the document, not testifying against a person—the question is less severe, because Rabbinic law can establish that one witness suffices to validate a document. But once the husband contests it, we are no longer dealing with a question about the document; we are dealing with testimony against a person, which requires two witnesses by Torah law. The shiur explores the principle of taninan mezuyaf: the court acts as the defendant's representative and asserts on his behalf that the document may be forged, which is why two witnesses are normally required even at the Rabbinic level. However, in a case of igunah (where the woman would otherwise be unable to remarry), the Rabbis waive the requirement for two witnesses to merely validate the document, though they do not allow the court to act as the husband's advocate in asserting forgery. This is why one witness suffices in the igunah case.
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Gittin 2a
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