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When eidim testify that a person committed knas but he admitted earlier outside beis din, is he obligated to pay? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether eid echad can obligate knas and whether tfisa (seizure) is valid for knas obligations. The Rashba argues knas only takes effect retroactively when confirmed in beis din, while the Rosh holds tfisa can establish the obligation even earlier.
This shiur analyzes a complex Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma 64b dealing with the interplay between knas (fines), hodaa (admission), and eidim (witnesses). The central case involves a situation where someone admits to a crime requiring knas outside of beis din (hodaa chutz la'beis din), and later witnesses testify in beis din. The fundamental question is whether such a person is obligated to pay the knas. The Gemara presents a difficulty: if eid echad (one witness) testifies that someone is liable for knas, this should obligate the person to take a shevu'ah (oath). If the person refuses to swear or admits to the claim, why doesn't the principle of "moda b'knas patur" (one who admits to a knas is exempt) apply? The Ketzos HaChoshen raises this question, noting that according to Tosfos, even when eid echad makes someone liable for a shevu'ah, if the person admits rather than swearing, this is still considered "marshia atzmo" (self-incrimination) and should trigger the exemption of moda b'knas.
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Bava Kamma 64b
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