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Why does a metzora's obligation to shave override certain Torah (תורה) prohibitions but not others? The Gemara (גמרא) derives the principle that asei docheh lo saaseh she'eino shaveh ba'kol (a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment that does not apply equally to everyone). The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s approach—that the entire discussion concerns lo saaseh she'eino shaveh ba'kol rather than a plain lav—and explores the conceptual difficulty of why "not applying equally" makes a prohibition weaker.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes Yevamos 5a, focusing on the derivation of the principle that asei docheh lo saaseh she'eino shaveh ba'kol (a positive commandment can override a negative commandment that does not apply equally to all people). The discussion centers on the mitzvah (מצוה) of a metzora (one with tzara'as) to shave all his hair, which seemingly conflicts with various Torah (תורה) prohibitions against cutting hair. The Gemara opens by establishing that the Torah's requirement for the metzora to shave his "rosh" (head) teaches that the positive commandment overrides even prohibitions like lo sakif (the prohibition against removing the payos/corners of one's head), which would normally be violated when shaving completely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle extends to different categories of prohibitions based on whether they apply universally (shaveh ba'kol) or only to certain people (eino shaveh ba'kol).
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Yevamos 5a
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