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Can a husband revoke a get after appointing a shliach to deliver it? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet on whether chozer bo applies. The shiur traces multiple approaches: is this bitul of the get itself (like a sefer Torah (תורה) that cannot be undone), or only bitul of the shlichus? The resolution hinges on whether the shemah aspect of the get is already complete or still being accomplished.
The shiur opens with the core dispute on Gittin 32a between Rav Nachman, who holds chozer bo (the husband cannot revoke the get), and Rav Sheshet, who holds ein chozer bo (revocation is possible). The Gemara (גמרא) challenges Rav Nachman from a parallel case in kiddushin where one can be chozer within thirty days. The difficulty is understanding why kiddushin can be revoked but a get cannot. Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental question: what exactly does "bitul haget" mean? According to Rashi (רש"י), when you revoke a get, you are being mevatel the shlichus—you're removing the agent's authority—but not necessarily invalidating the get document itself. According to the Ran, chozer bo means you cannot act against the get's validity at all; the revocation attempt itself is ineffective.
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Gittin 32a
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