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Does the prohibition of dichuy (rejection) apply when a chefetz (object) becomes valid only after the mitzvah (מצוה) time begins? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), and Rav Chananel to develop a fundamental chakira: is the zman (time) itself the mechayev (obligating factor) in mitzvah, or merely the opportunity to fulfill a pre-existing obligation? This distinction resolves the Gemara (גמרא)'s proof from kisui hadam and addresses the Noda B'Yehuda's question about koton's validity for shechita versus tefillin.
This shiur on Sukkah 31a-b examines a fundamental question in the laws of dichuy (rejection): when an object used for a mitzvah (מצוה) was initially pasul (invalid) but later becomes kosher, can it still be used? The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion centers on whether there is a din of dichuy in mitzvos, specifically when a chefetz shel mitzvah was unavailable or invalid at the beginning of the time period but becomes available or valid later. Rabbi Zweig begins by presenting the basic case: if at seven o'clock in the morning an object lacked the necessary qualities for a mitzvah (for example, it did not have a tamra), but by twelve o'clock it acquired those qualities, can it now be used? The question is whether the initial invalidity creates a permanent rejection (dichuy), or whether we say that since it is now valid when the person wishes to fulfill the mitzvah, it may be used.
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Sukkah 31a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
