A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When someone designates an item as pe'ah or tzedakah, does verbal designation ("yad") alone create the consecration, or is a physical action required? The shiur traces a Gemara (גמרא) debate through the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings in hilchos matnos aniyim, arguing that "tafsi b'kidusha" hinges on whether the kedushah has taken effect yet, not on whether the woman is mekudeshes. The analysis exposes a fundamental question: is ba'al ta'achur a din in the object (pe'ah, tzedakah) or in the person's obligation?
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s phrase "tafsi b'kidusha," examining whether it means the woman is actually mekudeshes or whether the kiddushin has simply taken effect. Rabbi Zweig presents an alternative reading to the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s understanding: the question is not whether she is mekudeshes versus ein mekudeshes, but whether the kiddushin has been "tafis" (seized/taken effect) yet. He suggests that "tafsi b'kidusha" may be lashon chatfasa—you're being "matfis" in the kiddushin, seizing the kiddushin itself, not just becoming mekudeshes. The shiur then transitions to the Ran's position regarding the concept of "ein hekesh l'machah"—is there a full hekesh (textual connection) between tzedakah and korbanos, or only regarding ba'al ta'achur (the prohibition against delaying)? The Ran argues that because pe'ah and tzedakah are not written explicitly in the Torah (תורה) (only "befichah" and "meimcha"), they lack the force of a full hekesh. This raises a fundamental question: why does it matter whether the word appears explicitly in the text if we know through Torah She'ba'al Peh that "befichah" means tzedakah?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim (specific daf unclear from transcript)
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
