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Why does kiddushin work with sheveh kesef (subjective value) when the Torah (תורה) says "kesef" (money)? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's proof from the lashon of ledidei sheveli (personal valuation) rather than from the braisa about an eagle. It emerges that Tosfos is teaching that subjective value is Torah-recognized value—a fundamental principle needed for kinyan kiddushin.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 2a, focusing on Tosfos's treatment of the question: How do we know that sheveh kesef (an object worth money) has the same status as kesef (actual money) for kiddushin? The Gemara (גמרא) states that we learn this from the pasuk by eved ivri, and also from the case of Rav Kahana using a sudra (scarf) for pidyon haben. Rabbi Zweig opens by noting a fundamental question: Why does Tosfos bring the proof from Rav Kahana's sudra and the principle of "ledidei sheveli" (according to his personal valuation) when there is an earlier, more explicit braisa stating that an "egel zeh al pidyon beno" (this calf for redemption of my son) is valid? The braisa directly states that pidyon haben can be performed with an object, not just silver. Why does Tosfos bypass this straightforward source and instead cite a later case involving subjective valuation?
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Kiddushin 2a
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