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What is the concept of yadayim (implied language) in kiddushin, and when does indirect language create a valid marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: unlike nedarim where we merely need to know what you meant, kiddushin requires a maaseh (act) itself to be recognizable as kiddushin, not just understandable intent. The Ran's position that yadayim she'einan mochichos (unclear implications) may not work by kiddushin is explained through this framework.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 5b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of yadayim she'einan mochichos (indirect or implied language) in the context of kiddushin. The central question is whether implied language that does not explicitly state "harei at mekudeshes li" can create a valid marriage. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing a fundamental principle: yadayim in kiddushin cannot be understood the same way as yadayim in nedarim. By nedarim, the concept of yadayim means we know what the person intended—if someone says "d'avar zeh asur alai" without saying "k'korban," we understand they meant to prohibit it like a korban. The pasuk is marbeh (expands) to include such cases. But yadayim cannot mean "we know what you meant" in a vacuum—the question is always whether you expressed it adequately, not whether you internally intended it.
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Kiddushin 5b
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