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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin formulate "dvarim shebiksav cannot be said ba'al peh" while the Gemara in Temurah reverses the order? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: the issur has two distinct dimensions—one governing the chefetz (physical form) of Torah (תורה), the other governing the ma'aseh of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah itself. This resolves apparent contradictions in Tosafos (תוספות), Rashi (רש"י), and the machlokes over eis la'asos Lashem.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental halacha (הלכה) of dvarim shebiksav—that which is written may not be said orally, and dvarim shebe'al peh—oral Torah (תורה) may not be written down. The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin derives both dinim from the same pasuk in Ki Sisa: "Ksav lecha es hadevarim ha'eilah, ki al pi hadevarim ha'eilah." The first phrase teaches Torah Shebiksav must be written; the second teaches Torah Shebe'al Peh must be oral. Yet the parallel Gemara in Temurah reverses the formulation, deriving from the first phrase that Torah Shebe'al Peh cannot be written, and from the second that Torah Shebiksav cannot be said orally. The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות) in Bava Kamma (daf 4a) addressing how Rav Yosef was able to say Targum on Nevi'im ba'al peh, given that even Targum—Aramaic translation—is still considered dvarim shebiksav. Tosafos offers that the heter was eis la'asos Lashem (a special dispensation in times of need). Yet Tosafos elsewhere in Shabbos (שבת) suggests Targum itself is not subject to the issur of dvarim shebiksav. The Maharsha notes a fundamental difficulty: the Gemara in Gittin records that Rav Yosef himself rejects the principle of eis la'asos Lashem in the context of reading from an incomplete sefer haftaros, so how can Tosafos invoke eis la'asos Lashem as Rav Yosef's own heter?
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Bava Kamma 4a
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