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When a get falls in his daled amos and she enters, is it valid? The shiur analyzes the Rashba's position that the first one there excludes the second, contrasting it with Rashi (רש"י)'s view that daled amos creates a kinyan for the one standing there. The discussion explores whether yachol lishmoram means actual physical ability to retrieve the get or merely legal proximity.
This shiur continues yesterday's analysis of Gittin 78b, focusing on the case where a get falls in the husband's daled amos and the wife enters to be koneh. The central question is whether the husband being there first precludes the wife from acquiring the get. According to the Rashba's position, "kor v'lo" (he came and she came afterward) creates a fundamental problem: since he arrived at the daled amos first, it is his daled amos, and her subsequent entry cannot effect a valid kinyan even though she has the right to acquire the get there. The shiur raises a difficulty with this approach: if the first person's presence automatically precludes the second, the Gemara (גמרא)'s entire discussion about whether they can both acquire simultaneously (efshar l'tsamtem) seems misplaced—the Gemara should have immediately asked about sequential arrival rather than going through the stage of simultaneous presence.
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Gittin 78b
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