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Why is one witness (eid echad) believed for verifying that a get was written lishmah, when normally two witnesses are required in Jewish law? The shiur explores Rabba's and Rava's explanations through the principle of "eid echad ne'eman be'issurin" (a single witness is believed regarding prohibitions), examining cases from shechitah, terumos, and challah. The discussion probes whether testimony about a get's validity is truly judicial testimony or merely fact-finding.
This shiur focuses on a complex discussion in Gittin 2b concerning the testimony required to verify that a get (bill of divorce) was written lishmah (in the name of the specific woman and man). The Mishna states that one witness (eid echad) is sufficient to testify "befanai nichtav" (it was written before me). This raises a fundamental question: why should one witness suffice when the general rule in Torah (תורה) law is that testimony requires two witnesses? The Gemara (גמרא) offers the principle "eid echad ne'eman be'issurin" - a single witness is believed regarding matters of issur (prohibitions). Rashi (רש"י) illustrates this principle with several examples: hafrashas terumah (separation of terumah), shechitah (ritual slaughter), and nikur gid hanasheh (removal of the sciatic nerve). In all these cases, one person can testify that the proper procedures were followed, and we believe him.
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Gittin 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
