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Why is one witness (eid echad) believed for verifying that a get was written lishmah, when normally two witnesses are required in Jewish law? The shiur explores Rabba's and Rava's explanations through the principle of "eid echad ne'eman be'issurin" (a single witness is believed regarding prohibitions), examining cases from shechitah, terumos, and challah. The discussion probes whether testimony about a get's validity is truly judicial testimony or merely fact-finding.
This shiur focuses on a complex discussion in Gittin 2b concerning the testimony required to verify that a get (bill of divorce) was written lishmah (in the name of the specific woman and man). The Mishna states that one witness (eid echad) is sufficient to testify "befanai nichtav" (it was written before me). This raises a fundamental question: why should one witness suffice when the general rule in Torah (תורה) law is that testimony requires two witnesses? The Gemara (גמרא) offers the principle "eid echad ne'eman be'issurin" - a single witness is believed regarding matters of issur (prohibitions). Rashi (רש"י) illustrates this principle with several examples: hafrashas terumah (separation of terumah), shechitah (ritual slaughter), and nikur gid hanasheh (removal of the sciatic nerve). In all these cases, one person can testify that the proper procedures were followed, and we believe him.
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Gittin 2b
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