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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) require spending a third of one's wealth on certain mitzvos, when the general rule is only a fifth? Rashi (רש"י) distinguishes mitzvos where the Torah (תורה) mandates ownership (lulav, tzitzis, sefer Torah) from those it doesn't (sukkah, shofar). On mitzvos with both an ownership requirement and hidur mitzvah (מצוה), one must spend up to a third even if borrowing is possible, reflecting the Torah's demand for personal investment and beautification.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 9a-b, which discusses the principle of "ad shlish"—spending up to a third of one's wealth on mitzvos. The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement appears to contradict the well-known principle from Kesubos that one should not spend more than a fifth (chamish) on mitzvos. The shiur resolves this apparent contradiction through a careful reading of Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi's peculiar formulation. Rashi lists three specific mitzvos—lulav, tzitzis, and sefer Torah (תורה)—while omitting sukkah and shofar, which appear in the Gemara's parallel discussion of hidur mitzvah (מצוה) in Shabbos (שבת). Furthermore, Rashi structures his comment unusually, separating "m'vazez" (spending) from "shlish beiso" (a third of one's wealth), rather than presenting them as a unified phrase. These textual anomalies point to a fundamental distinction.
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Bava Kamma 9a-b
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