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What makes a document legally binding—the witnesses who signed it or the witnesses who saw it delivered? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s question on transferring a shtar chov witnessed only at delivery. Rabbi Zweig argues that the core machloket between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar concerns whether divorce requires a formal document (shtar) or is simply a written act of separation—reshaping how we understand eidei mesira lishma.
The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות)'s fundamental question about shetarot (documents): When witnesses see the delivery (eidei mesira) of a shtar chov (promissory note) but never signed it, does this create a valid shtar that can be transferred to a third party? Since the obligation exists only through the oral testimony of the delivery witnesses, not through the document itself, can such a shtar be sold or transferred from Reuven to Shimon? Tosafos brings several rayos (proofs) to explore this question. First, from gittin: even when eidei mesira witness the get's delivery after thirty days (when they're not present at the moment of divorce), the get is valid. This suggests that eidei mesira need not be present at the actual moment of kinyan, only at the original delivery. Second, from a disputed interpretation of the Gemara (גמרא): a mefaresh learns that when one is mekadesh a woman with a shtar chov that has only eidei mesira, according to Rav Elazar (who holds eidei mesira karsi), the kiddushin works. This implies the shtar can be transferred.
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Gittin 4a
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