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What makes a document legally binding—the witnesses who signed it or the witnesses who saw it delivered? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s question on transferring a shtar chov witnessed only at delivery. Rabbi Zweig argues that the core machloket between Rav Meir and Rav Elazar concerns whether divorce requires a formal document (shtar) or is simply a written act of separation—reshaping how we understand eidei mesira lishma.
The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות)'s fundamental question about shetarot (documents): When witnesses see the delivery (eidei mesira) of a shtar chov (promissory note) but never signed it, does this create a valid shtar that can be transferred to a third party? Since the obligation exists only through the oral testimony of the delivery witnesses, not through the document itself, can such a shtar be sold or transferred from Reuven to Shimon? Tosafos brings several rayos (proofs) to explore this question. First, from gittin: even when eidei mesira witness the get's delivery after thirty days (when they're not present at the moment of divorce), the get is valid. This suggests that eidei mesira need not be present at the actual moment of kinyan, only at the original delivery. Second, from a disputed interpretation of the Gemara (גמרא): a mefaresh learns that when one is mekadesh a woman with a shtar chov that has only eidei mesira, according to Rav Elazar (who holds eidei mesira karsi), the kiddushin works. This implies the shtar can be transferred.
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Gittin 4a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
