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Why doesn't a niddah fall into the category of arayos that are excluded from yibum? The shiur analyzes Tosfos and the Rosh, distinguishing between exclusion from yibum (like arayos) versus prohibition of yibum (like chayavei lavin). An issur that is omed to go off—such as niddah—creates neither exclusion nor nesirah, because it defines a temporary state rather than the essence of the woman.
This shiur on Yevamos 2a centers on a fundamental question: Why is a niddah not considered an ervah that would exclude a yevama from the entire parsha of yibum? The Gemara (גמרא)'s own answer—that an ervah requires bal lo kanah (the marriage takes effect), whereas with a niddah, bal kanah (it does)—leaves Tosfos dissatisfied. Tosfos asks: a niddah is listed among the arayos in the Torah (תורה) and the hekesh should make her like the fifteen arayos that are excluded from yibum. Why, then, does the kedusha of yibum take effect at all? Tosfos offers two answers. First, a niddah is not truly comparable to the other arayos because those issurim are permanent, whereas niddah is omed litahar—the issur is destined to go off once she immerses in the mikvah. This distinction, Tosfos suggests, removes her from the category of ervah. Second, Tosfos argues that in bal kanah—the fact that kiddushin would take effect—demonstrates that she is not in the same parsha as the arayos enumerated in the context of yibum.
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Yevamos 2a
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