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Why don't kiddushei kesef get retroactively cancelled when forced by circumstances? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s revolutionary approach that kesef creates only civil acquisition while spiritual ishus comes later. This explains why ein onnes b'gittin produces a valid divorce rather than retroactive cancellation.
This shiur analyzes the complex Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 3a regarding the principle of "kol mekadesh al daas d'rabbanan mekadesh" and its application to different forms of kiddushin. The Gemara presents a fundamental shakla v'tarya about whether Chachamim can retroactively uproot marriages, particularly distinguishing between kiddushei kesef and kiddushei bi'ah. Rashi (רש"י) and the early authorities learned that kiddushei kesef is only d'rabbanan, leading to serious difficulties. If the marriage was never valid mid'oraisa, how can there be capital punishment for adultery, and why would she need to bring a korban for inadvertent relations? The Rashbam suggests the marriage is uprooted retroactively (nekul l'mafrei'a), but this creates impossible halachic consequences - a kohen could marry her, and the husband could marry her sister.
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Kesubos 3a
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Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
