No community start suggestion yet.
When a woman says "give" (hav) in response to a kiddushin proposal, is that valid acceptance? The Gemara (גמרא)'s question parallels the din of orev (guarantor) where the recipient of money differs from the one being obligated. Tosafos (תוספות) suggests kiddushin may not require actual exchange—merely the woman's willingness to marry combined with some transaction is sufficient, challenging the assumption that kiddushin kesef works like a standard acquisition.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 10b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of whether a woman's response of "hav" (give) or "tane" (give me) constitutes valid acceptance of kiddushin. The central question is whether kiddushin requires an actual exchange—a quid pro quo where the woman is "purchased" with the object—or whether it suffices that she agrees to marry and receives something of value. The Gemara presents several cases where a woman's language creates doubt about whether she's accepting kiddushin. In one case, she asks for an object, he offers to give it as kiddushin, and she responds "hav hav" (give, give). In another, she says "tane" (give me). The question is whether this constitutes acceptance or rejection of the kiddushin proposition.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 10b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
