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Does kinyan shtar (acquisition through document) in kiddushin require das makneh (the seller's/makneh's knowledge), and if so, why? The Gemara (גמרא) derives from "mechir achuzaso" that shtar must be written by the macher (seller). Rabbi Zweig develops the yesod that shtar operates as a declaratory kinyan—the words themselves create the acquisition—not merely as proof. This explains why the makneh must participate and why kiddushin follows the same structure as shtar.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 9a, focusing on a fundamental question in the nature of kinyan shtar (acquisition via document): does it require das makneh (the knowledge and participation of the one effectuating the kinyan), and what is the source of this requirement? The Gemara (גמרא) presents two approaches: either the kinyan of get (divorce document) follows the model of kinyan zinin (straightforward kinyan), or we establish it based on makam savaya tzad gogi (a parallel principle of acquisition). Rabbi Zweig explains that there are two distinct halachic dimensions to kiddushin: the get aspect (which teaches that a document is valid for kiddushin) and the kiddushin aspect proper (which establishes the modes of kinyan). The fact that a document works for kiddushin is derived from the parallel to get. But the internal structure of how that document functions—whether it operates as a kinyan, whether it requires das makneh—is learned from the laws of kiddushin themselves, particularly from kesef and shtar zivna.
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Kiddushin 9a
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