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Does matana al manas lehachzir (a gift given on condition it be returned) count as a valid gift? The Gemara (גמרא) compares four cases: kiddushin, sale, pidyon haben, and terumah. The shiur develops a fundamental distinction—is the condition placed on the giving of the object itself, or on an external consequence like the kiddushin? This chakira reshapes how we understand ownership, reciprocal obligation, and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s cryptic formulation.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 6b presents a famous difficulty: if matana al manas lehachzir (a gift given on condition it be returned) is not considered a valid gift, why does it work for terumah and esrog but not for kiddushin, sale, or pidyon haben? The shiur begins by analyzing the apparent contradiction—either it should work in all four cases or in none. The Rishonim struggle with the prerequisite that any valid matana must be something the recipient can be makdish (consecrate). The Gemara in another context states that anything one cannot consecrate is not a valid gift. The standard answer is that this Gemara refers to a sham gift, not a genuine limitation on matana. The Raavad offers an alternative: even in matana al manas lehachzir, the recipient can consecrate the temporary use (hishtamshus) of the object, which represents real value. But this creates a difficulty—if the recipient has real value that can be transferred to hekdesh, how can we maintain that matana al manas lehachzir is "lo shmo matana"?
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Kiddushin 6b
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