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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) permit moving an egg on Shabbos (שבת) but forbid rainwater? Tosafos (תוספות) distinguishes two distinct forms of nolad—one where the object exists but wasn't mentally prepared, and another where it doesn't yet exist in the world. The Gemara's maskana redefines nolad: the prohibition applies only when the object doesn't exist, not merely when it's unexpected.
This shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות) on Beitzah 2a, focusing on the fundamental distinction between muktzeh and nolad. The discussion begins with a textual difficulty in Tosafos: the Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests that Beis Shammai permits moving objects because "leis lei muktzeh," yet we know they do hold muktzeh in certain contexts (baalei chaim). Tosafos explains they hold muktzeh only in more stringent cases. The central question emerges: Why does the Gemara say rainwater collected in a vessel on Shabbos (שבת) is nolad and therefore prohibited, while an egg laid on Yom Tov is permitted? Tosafos identifies a seeming contradiction—Rav Shimon permits moving broken vessels (shivrei keilim) despite them being newly created, yet the Gemara prohibits rainwater which is also newly accessible.
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Beitzah 2a
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