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Does biah create only erusin, or can it create nisuin as well? The shiur analyzes whether biah is a single act of declaring ownership (like karka) or two simultaneous acts—ownership and possession—distinguishing between the Gaon's approach (one-dimensional) and the Ran's approach (two-dimensional), with major halachic implications for whether the woman is permitted to her husband.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 10a, focusing on the fundamental question of whether biah (marital relations) creates only erusin (betrothal) or can also create nisuin (full marriage). The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion raises the question: when biah occurs, does it accomplish only erusin, or does it accomplish nisuin as well? The shiur demonstrates that this cannot be a simple definitional question, since we already know what erusin and nisuin are; rather, the Gemara must be exploring something deeper about the nature of kinyan biah. The shiur identifies two fundamentally different approaches to understanding this sugya. The Gaon holds that biah nisuin osa means that biah is a single act of declaring ownership, but the quality of that ownership extends to the ishus (marital relationship) itself, not just the woman as an object. This is similar to kinyan karka, where the kinyan shows ownership rather than taking possession. According to this view, biah does not create actual possession (hachnasas l'rishus); it merely declares ownership over a broader domain. Consequently, even if we hold biah nisuin osa, the woman remains forbidden to her husband until she is actually brought into his domain through chuppah.
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Kiddushin 10a
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