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Why does a woman refuse to marry when an object's value must be evaluated later, even when she's fully protected? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s shift from kiddushin with an object to kiddushin with a fixed monetary amount. The core difficulty: if she agrees to marry only when the object is worth fifty and it turns out worth forty-nine she's not married, so what psychological commitment is lacking according to Rav Yosef's principle of semichut da'at?
This shiur presents an analysis of a dispute between Rabba and Rav Yosef on Kiddushin 7b concerning whether a woman is mekudeshes when the value of the kiddushin object needs to be evaluated after the betrothal. The fundamental question is what constitutes adequate semichut da'at (mental commitment/reliance) for a valid kiddushin. The shiur begins by analyzing the case as Rabbi Zweig initially understands it without Rashi (רש"י): a man says "marry me with this object that is worth fifty," and after evaluation it is indeed worth fifty—she is mekudeshes. But if it is worth only forty-nine, according to Rabba she would still be mekudeshes, while according to Rav Yosef she is not mekudeshes because ein semichut da'atan—she lacks sufficient mental commitment to marry under such uncertain conditions. The sevara would be that she doesn't want to risk being "stuck"—she agreed to marry for an object worth fifty, not forty-nine, and doesn't want to be cheated or taken advantage of.
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Kiddushin 7b
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