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Why does Tosafos (תוספות) initially say we ignore the daughter's daas entirely in yiud, yet later call yiud baal korchah to both father and daughter? The shiur resolves this by distinguishing the kinyan shifchus (which comes from the original money) from the ishah status (which emerges through yiud). This framework explains why kesef by ishah is not truly baal korchah—the acquisition comes from shifchus, not from the maaseh yiud itself.
This shiur addresses a fundamental tension in Tosafos (תוספות)'s treatment of yiud (designation of a Jewish maidservant as a wife). The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 5a discusses why the Torah (תורה) needed to explicitly mention kesef (money) as a form of kiddushin, given that we might have derived it from shtar (document) and biyah (relations). The Gemara answers that shtar and biyah work even baal korchah (against her will), whereas by ishah kesef is not baal korchah. The Gemara then challenges this by pointing to amah ivriyah (Hebrew maidservant), which is baal korchah, and concludes that kesef by ishah must be fundamentally different. Tosafos raises two critical questions. First, Tosafos states that the yiud process is baal korchah to both the father and the daughter. Yet earlier, Tosafos had maintained that we do not reckon with the daughter's daas at all—her consent is irrelevant. How can Tosafos simultaneously hold both positions? Second, Tosafos asks: if yiud is indeed ishah baal korchah, why does the Gemara claim that by ishah there is no baal korchah? The answer Tosafos gives appears cryptic: "the money was not given for ishah but for shifchus, therefore it is not ishah."
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Kiddushin 5a
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