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When must one interrupt eating or other activities to perform a mitzvah (מצוה)? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between yesh shos (time remains) and ein shos (no time left), and between d'Oraisa and d'Rabbanan obligations. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s view—that one need not interrupt unless the mitzvah cannot be done later—contrasts sharply with the Rosh and Ran, who hold that mitzvah bo'liyos al tachmitzena requires immediate action even when time remains.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Sukkah 38a addressing when one is obligated to interrupt an activity to perform a mitzvah (מצוה). The core question revolves around the distinction between yesh shos (when there is still time to perform the mitzvah later) and ein shos (when time is running out), as well as the difference between d'Oraisa (Torah (תורה)-level) and d'Rabbanan (Rabbinic-level) obligations. The Gemara (גמרא) presents three approaches. The first teretz suggests that for d'Oraisa obligations, even with yesh shos one must interrupt, while for d'Rabbanan obligations one need not interrupt unless there is ein shos. Rava objects and offers a second approach, distinguishing between yesh shos and ein shos within the sugya of lulav itself. Rav Zeira presents a third approach, arguing that the entire obligation to interrupt applies only to d'Rabbanan mitzvos where shema yishkach v'yifshe (lest one forget and miss the time) is a concern.
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Sukkah 38a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
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Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
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