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When does an asei override a lo taaseh? The shiur analyzes whether asei docheh lo taaseh means the asei remains obligatory but circumstances prevent fulfillment, whether it's a psak halacha (הלכה) of shev ve'al taaseh, or whether the asei was never given where the lo taaseh applies. The Rivvo and Rabbeinu Nissim's positions are explored through Yevamos 5a and parallel sugyos in Shabbos (שבת), Chulin, and Zevachim.
This advanced shiur provides a deep analysis of the principle of asei docheh lo taaseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative one), focusing primarily on Yevamos 5a and exploring when this principle applies and its underlying conceptual framework. The shiur opens by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between lo taaseh she'eino shoveh bakol (a prohibition that doesn't apply equally to all) and lo taaseh hashoveh bakol (one that does apply equally). The fundamental question is why an asei can override the former but not the latter when combined with an issur asei (a positive prohibition). The challenge is conceptual: if an asei can override one lav, it should override multiple lavin; adding an issur asei should make no difference since it's merely additional stringency, not a different category of prohibition. The Rambam (רמב"ם) in Mishneh Torah (תורה) demonstrates this by not counting an issur asei as a separate mitzvah (מצוה) when it accompanies a lo taaseh.
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Yevamos 5a
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