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Can kiddushin be learned from hafara'as nedarim? The shiur examines Rav Akiva Eiger's six difficult kashas on Tosfos, exploring why kiddushin cannot be derived from the father's authority over vows. Tosfos' fundamental yesod emerges: kiddushin is not merely a chalos issur but a transfer of ownership—the father conveys ownership he possesses, making it issur she'yesh bo mamona that cannot be learned from pure issur.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Rav Akiva Eiger's six challenging kashas on Tosfos in Masechta Kiddushin, focusing on why kiddushin cannot be derived from hafara'as nedarim (a father's ability to annul his daughter's vows). Rabbi Zweig methodically works through each question to uncover Tosfos' fundamental understanding of what kiddushin actually is. The Gemara (גמרא)'s basic question is whether the law that a father controls his daughter's kiddushin (ha'av zakai b'kiddushin bito) can be learned from hafara'as nedarim, where the father has authority over his daughter's vows. The Gemara rejects this because it would be issur she'yesh bo mamona—an issur matter that involves monetary consequences—which cannot be learned from pure issur. Tosfos then asks: why not learn just that the father performs the ma'aseh kiddushin from hafara'as nedarim, while deriving that he receives the money from a separate gezeira shava? The Gemara responds that this still cannot work because if the father performs the ma'aseh kiddushin, he will inevitably wind up with the money, making it issur she'yesh bo mamona.
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Kiddushin 3b-4a
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