No community start suggestion yet.
Is yad (implication) a formal lashon (language), or does it merely reveal intent? The Ran holds yad creates precise legal language—"dover shemashmo etzel kol ha'am." The Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguishes: in Kiddushin, two-party transactions require formal lashon; in Nedarim, mere expression of intent (hotzi b'sfasav) suffices, even when not clearly understood by others.
This shiur examines the fundamental dispute between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and the Ran regarding the nature of yad (implication) in halachic contexts, focusing primarily on Nedarim 6b and its applications to Kiddushin and Pe'ah. The core question: Is yad merely an indication of what a person intends, or is it actually a form of formal legal language? The Ran holds that yad functions as a complete lashon—when we understand someone's intent from context, the law treats it as if they spoke explicitly. The Rambam, however, distinguishes between different halachic realms.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim 6b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
