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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) contrast the laws of mechitzos (partitions) in Shabbos (שבת) versus gittin? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: by Shabbos, an object must "stop" (noach) in the reshus; by gittin, it must physically reach the ground (kluta kamishun chadam). The upshot is that "mintar" (guarded/secure) is not an add-on to chatzer—it defines the chatzer of get itself.
This advanced shiur explores Gittin 79a, focusing on a complex Gemara (גמרא) regarding the distinction between the halachic requirements of mechitzos (partitions) and mintar (security/guarding) in hilchos Shabbos (שבת) versus hilchos gittin. The central question is: why does a get that lands in a certain location require different conditions to be valid compared to the parallel requirements in Shabbos law? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara's statement "ein hakinah me'itznok" and what it means for a get to have "noach" (rest). According to Rashi (רש"י), the concept of kluta (settling) in Shabbos means the object has stopped in the reshus (domain)—it doesn't necessarily have to be physically on the ground. The object must have a "presence" in the reshus, not merely be passing through. However, in hilchos gittin, the requirement is stricter: the get must actually hit the ground (kluta kamishun chadam) because it needs to be in her reshus in a tangible, physical way—it must be "by the person," not just "in the reshus."
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Gittin 79a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
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