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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) contrast the laws of mechitzos (partitions) in Shabbos (שבת) versus gittin? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: by Shabbos, an object must "stop" (noach) in the reshus; by gittin, it must physically reach the ground (kluta kamishun chadam). The upshot is that "mintar" (guarded/secure) is not an add-on to chatzer—it defines the chatzer of get itself.
This advanced shiur explores Gittin 79a, focusing on a complex Gemara (גמרא) regarding the distinction between the halachic requirements of mechitzos (partitions) and mintar (security/guarding) in hilchos Shabbos (שבת) versus hilchos gittin. The central question is: why does a get that lands in a certain location require different conditions to be valid compared to the parallel requirements in Shabbos law? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara's statement "ein hakinah me'itznok" and what it means for a get to have "noach" (rest). According to Rashi (רש"י), the concept of kluta (settling) in Shabbos means the object has stopped in the reshus (domain)—it doesn't necessarily have to be physically on the ground. The object must have a "presence" in the reshus, not merely be passing through. However, in hilchos gittin, the requirement is stricter: the get must actually hit the ground (kluta kamishun chadam) because it needs to be in her reshus in a tangible, physical way—it must be "by the person," not just "in the reshus."
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Gittin 79a
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