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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman by giving a mashkan (collateral) for money he promises? The shiur develops the fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on the nature of mashkan. Rashi sees mashkan as transferring property rights to secure an obligation; Tosfos sees it as transferring the personal obligation itself. The analysis explains why mashkan d'acher (collateral from a third party) works for kiddushin, while a direct promise with collateral does not.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 8a-b focusing on the sugya of mashkan (collateral) and its role in kiddushin. The central question is why a man cannot be mekadesh a woman when he promises to give her money and provides a mashkan as security, yet can be mekadesh her with mashkan d'acher (collateral he holds from someone else who owes him money). The shiur develops a fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on the nature of mashkan. According to Rashi, mashkan represents a transfer of property rights (shibud nechosin) to secure a personal obligation. When someone promises to give money but has not yet created a personal obligation, there is no basis for mashkan. The expression "mon ein kan, mashkan ein kan" (no money, no mashkan) reflects that without a personal obligation, the concept of mashkan has no legal foundation. The property guarantee only exists when there's an underlying obligation to guarantee.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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