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How can Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai say Kriat Shema fulfills Torah (תורה) study in one place, yet demand constant learning without work in another? The Shulchan Aruch HaRav resolves this by distinguishing two separate mitzvos: the act of learning Torah and knowing all of Torah. Those who already possess comprehensive knowledge need only minimal daily study to maintain the mitzvah (מצוה).
This shiur examines a fundamental contradiction between two Talmudic sources regarding the obligation of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah (תורה). The Gemara (גמרא) in Menachos presents a dispute between Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who holds that one fulfills the mitzvah (מצוה) of Torah study with just Kriat Shema morning and evening, and Rabbi Yishmael, who tells Ben Dama that there is no time when one is not obligated to learn Torah. However, in Brachos, these same Rabbis seem to take opposite positions: Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai argues that one must learn constantly without working for a livelihood, while Rabbi Yishmael permits combining Torah study with earning a living. The shiur explores the Ran's approach, which identifies three distinct levels of Torah study obligations: a basic minimum requirement from 'beshachbecha uvkumecha' (when you lie down and when you rise), a broader obligation to learn day and night from various derashot, and a requirement that Torah be 'mechudadim beficha' (sharp in your mouth) from 'veshinantam.' The Ran explains why saying Kriat Shema alone would not fulfill the latter requirement, as it doesn't encompass the breadth of Torah knowledge needed.
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Menachos 99b, Brachos 35b
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