No community start suggestion yet.
How can Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai say Kriat Shema fulfills Torah (תורה) study in one place, yet demand constant learning without work in another? The Shulchan Aruch HaRav resolves this by distinguishing two separate mitzvos: the act of learning Torah and knowing all of Torah. Those who already possess comprehensive knowledge need only minimal daily study to maintain the mitzvah (מצוה).
This shiur examines a fundamental contradiction between two Talmudic sources regarding the obligation of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah (תורה). The Gemara (גמרא) in Menachos presents a dispute between Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who holds that one fulfills the mitzvah (מצוה) of Torah study with just Kriat Shema morning and evening, and Rabbi Yishmael, who tells Ben Dama that there is no time when one is not obligated to learn Torah. However, in Brachos, these same Rabbis seem to take opposite positions: Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai argues that one must learn constantly without working for a livelihood, while Rabbi Yishmael permits combining Torah study with earning a living. The shiur explores the Ran's approach, which identifies three distinct levels of Torah study obligations: a basic minimum requirement from 'beshachbecha uvkumecha' (when you lie down and when you rise), a broader obligation to learn day and night from various derashot, and a requirement that Torah be 'mechudadim beficha' (sharp in your mouth) from 'veshinantam.' The Ran explains why saying Kriat Shema alone would not fulfill the latter requirement, as it doesn't encompass the breadth of Torah knowledge needed.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Menachos 99b, Brachos 35b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
