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Why is a get given "kintzei shtarchov" (on condition you find something better) invalid unless the husband says "hagita" (I told you)? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between the Ba'al HaMa'or and the Ra'avad on whether the problem is lack of knowledge of the husband's intent (da'at) or constitutes bitul ha-get. The resolution hinges on distinguishing between nullifying a get after nisina has begun versus postponing the nisina itself.
The shiur begins with a fundamental question from the Ba'al HaMa'or on the Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 78a regarding the case of kintzei shtarchov (a get given on condition that the wife finds something better). The Gemara elsewhere (in Yevamos) states that when a man gives a get and says "get zeh she'ani nosen l'ishti" (this is a get that I am giving to my wife) to witnesses, but then tells the wife "kintzei shtarchov zeh" (on condition you find something better), she is nonetheless divorced because of the principle "lo binan daita" (we don't require her da'at/knowledge). The Ba'al HaMa'or asks: if we don't need the wife's da'at, then why should saying kintzei shtarchov invalidate the get at all? What possible deficiency could there be in saying those words if da'at is not required? The shiur explores multiple dimensions of this question. One critical issue is whether there is a requirement of amira (verbal declaration) in gittin. The Gemara says "tzarich l'fareish" (one must specify), suggesting that some verbal declaration is necessary. But what exactly needs to be said, and to whom? The shiur examines whether this is similar to the requirement by kiddushin with a shtar, where Rashi (רש"י) holds no verbal declaration to the woman is needed because the shtar itself contains the necessary language.
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Gittin 78a
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