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Does a father own his daughter when he accepts her kiddushin, or does he merely have the right to perform the act of kiddushin on her behalf? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that the father has true ownership—explaining why mammon mi'issur lo yalfinan bars learning from haforas nedarim. A powerful proof emerges from the Minchas Chinuch: a father can sell his daughter but cannot bequeath her, challenging the Radbag's axiom that anything sellable must be transferable through inheritance.
The shiur addresses multiple kushiyos raised by Rav Akiva Eiger on Tosafos (תוספות) in Kiddushin 3b regarding the father's ability to accept kiddushin for his daughter. The central debate revolves around whether the father is a true owner of his daughter or merely has certain specific rights over her. The first kasha concerns why we don't learn kiddushin kesef from the hekesh of havayah li'yetziah. Tosafos in Kesubos questions why we can't learn out kiddushin kesef from a different source—learning the father's ability to accept kiddushin through shtar or biyah (which are issur-based) from haforas nedarim, and then learning kiddushin kesef from the hekesh. The shiur explains that Tosafos holds that "Av zakai" means the father is an actual owner of his daughter. When the father accepts kiddushin, he is performing a maaseh haknayah (act of acquisition) on his daughter, whom he owns. Since this is a mammon-based ownership transaction, we cannot learn it from haforas nedarim, which is purely issur-based. The principle of mammon mi'issur lo yalfinan applies because the essence of kiddushin involves ownership and sale, not merely because money changes hands.
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Kiddushin 3b
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