A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How does the principle of li'didi shaveh li ("to me it is worth") create halachic value? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s fundamental distinction between market price and subjective benefit received. The analysis shows this mechanism works only in non-exchange contexts like pidyon haben, not in acquisitions like kiddushin where market value is required.
This shiur analyzes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling in Hilchos Bikurim regarding the principle of li'didi shaveh li—the halachic mechanism by which a kohen can accept an object worth less than five shekalim as fulfilling the requirement of pidyon haben when he receives it "as five shekalim." The Rambam states that if the father gives a vessel not worth five shekalim, but the kohen accepts it as five, the son is redeemed. Several preliminary observations challenge conventional understandings: First, the Rambam applies this principle even to objects worth less than a shaveh peruta, suggesting li'didi shaveh li works even below the minimal threshold of monetary value—a position not shared by the Ran, who limits it to objects close to peruta value. Second, the Gemara (גמרא)'s limitation that only Rav Kahana (a gavra raba, great person) can say li'didi shaveh li appears to contradict the Braisa which states the halacha (הלכה) without qualification. The shiur examines four approaches to reconciling the Rambam with the Gemara's limitation. The Beis Yosef suggests that as long as there exists one person in the world for whom the object is worth five shekalim, everyone can use li'didi shaveh li. This approach is challenged both conceptually (why should one person's valuation create universal value?) and textually (the Rambam never mentions this condition). The Bach proposes that when the father explicitly states the object is worth five, the kohen's acceptance suffices; only when the father is silent must the object actually be worth five to the kohen. This reading is rejected as contradicting the plain language of both the Gemara and Rambam. The Taz argues there are two separate halachos: when the kohen explicitly accepts it "as five" it works even if worthless to him, but when he merely receives benefit worth five without explicit acceptance, it must actually be worth that much. This too is found conceptually untenable—how can mere words create value when no actual benefit exists?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 8a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.